I. INTRODUCTION In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily' the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state police search of a student newspaper office based on traditional procedures for obtaining a search warrant against third parties not implicated in any crime. 2 The Court refused to rule that the first or fourth amendment rights of the newspaper required police, before conducting a search for evidence, to obtain a subpoena and to rely on voluntary compliance by the innocent third party to deliver the evidence. Amid wide and continuing criticism of the decision as insensitive to the first amendment rights of the institutional media, 3 members of Congress responded to the Court's suggestion in Stanford Daily that statutory protection against search warrant abuses could be developed. 4 In 1978 and 1979 numerous bills 5 were introduced in Congress imposing a variety of additional procedures on law enforcement officials seeking to obtain warrants to search places not implicated in crimes. The requirement common to the bills was that the government must show probable cause to believe that the person possessing the material had committed or was committing the criminal offense for which the materials were sought. The bills, however, varied with regard to which persons and places should be protected. 6 Of special interest, however, were the constitutional bases set forth in the bills for imposing the additional requirements on state, as well as federal, law enforcement officials. There was little doubt that Congress could bind federal officials through the necessary and proper clause. 7 Of less certainty was the proper rationale, if any, for extending such restraints to state police searches of third parties. One theory posited that the work-product of media offices subject to third-party searches could be classified as material "in and affecting" commerce among the states, and thus searches involving such material were subject to Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce pursuant to the commerce clause. 8 An alternate theory posited that Congress had the power to regulate state searches under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, which provides that Congress may "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" of the amendment. 9 Under this rationale, Congress may pass legislation to protect the first and fourth amendment rights of third parties, rights that are applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Virtually identical issues faced Congress several years earlier in the wake of bills introduced following the Branzburg v. Hayes decision,' 0 in which the court refused to allow reporters to claim a constitutional privilege against revealing confidential news sources to grand juries. These issues were not confronted at that time, however, since a national 6 Some bills were limited to protecting the materials of the print and broadcast media, e.g., H.R. 3486, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) , while other bills, e.g., S. 3162, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) , extended protection to all third parties.
shield law to protect reporters was never enacted." This comment will examine alternate rationales for imposing on the states federal standards regulating third-party searches. First, the ability of Congress to regulate such searches under modern commerce clause theory-including the recent revival of the tenth amendment as a barrier to the exercise of such power-will be examined critically. The main focus of analysis under the commerce clause power will be a bill introduced in 1979, supported by the Carter administration. Second, the reach of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment in light of case law and scholarly commentary also will be questioned as a basis for extending the requirements imposed by the bills to the states.' 2 This comment will conclude that there are serious doubts as to whether either rationale provides a sufficient basis for extending such requirements to state law enforcement officials.
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE RATIONALE

MODERN COMMERCE CLAUSE THEORY
The commerce clause gives Congress power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states."' 3 In the bills overruling Stanford Daily, Congress is constructing a nonconstitutional framework to protect what it perceives as the first and fourth amendment rights of third parties subject to state searches. Such a framework can be supported by the commerce clause in two ways.
14 First, Congress can define the activities or materials that are in or affect interstate commerce. Examining the constitutionality of a statute grounded on this definitional rationale requires the statute to be considered on its face to determine whether the activity or material can be reached under the commerce power. Second, Congress can enact a general regulation of activity or material in or affecting interstate commerce; courts in each L.Q. 39 (1974) . However, the efforts to pass national shield legislation were revived following In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) It, 64 A.B.A. J. 1829 It, 64 A.B.A. J. (1978 . 12 A third basis on which Congress might reach state searches was not employed by any bill; Congress could attach conditions regarding searches to federal grants to the states. See note 75 infra.
. See Congress Could Enact Shield if Press Unites Behind
I' U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3. 14 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 n.12 (1974) instance must inquire whether the activity or material falls under the statutory language. A statute grounded on the latter rationale poses no constitutional problems on its face since a court in each case will determine the proper jurisdiction of the statute.
In 1979 the Carter administration announced its support for one of the bills introduced to overrule Stanford Daily-the First Amendment Privacy Protection Act of 1979.15 This bill followed the second approach available to Congress under the commerce power and did not define activities or material that are in or affect commerce. The drafters of the Act decided, after expressing concern about Congress' ability to reach state searches under the definitional approach, 1i to allow courts to determine jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. While the Privacy Protection Act does not rely on the definitional approach, that rationale is worth considering in order to examine the Carter administration's decision to pursue the alternate route. Moreover, this examination will provide a guide for determining the reach of the statutory language under the case-by-case approach adopted by the administration. S. 665 (1972) . See Dixon, supra note 11, at 46-48.
To limit the result of the Court's decision in Stanford Daily, Congress under the commerce power can either directly prohibit state searches of specified third parties or prohibit state searches of designated material possessed by third parties. The desired result in either case may be essentially the same, but different commerce power rationales must be applied to support each rationale.
Congressional authority to restrict search procedures of state law enforcement officials directly would fall under the third source of commerce power, the "affecting commerce" rationale.'
s To be cognizable under this prong of the commerce power, the activity sought to be regulated-in this case, state police searches of media or other third party materials-must have a substantial relationship to, or an effect on, interstate commerce. To prohibit state searches of all third parties arguably would extend beyond Congress' admittedly broad power to regulate activities that impact on commerce. The Court consistently has reiterated that the regulated activity must have a close and substantial relationship with, or effect on, commerce. 19 If such language is to be given any content, it must suggest that at some point activities that may have a slight effect on commerce will not fall under Congress' use of the commerce power to reach that activity.
20
However, a single activity which, when taken together with other instances of the same activity, theoretically might affect commerce can fall under the third commerce power. The source of this principle is Wickard v. Filburn, 21 where the Court found that a class of intrastate activities (growing grain for local consumption), when taken as a whole, would affect interstate commerce. Similarly, state police searches and the potential for such searches taken as a whole could disrupt media offices and discourage disclosure from confidential sources of information. Such interference could (1978). An additional power of Congress, the ability to regulate intrastate activities if the regulation is necessary to regulate the interstate shipment of goods, is often cited. See G. GuNrHER, supra note 11, at 188-203. This power can be regarded as a subspecies of the first power.
1s The other commerce powers would not be applicable. State police searches are not in the flow of comitierce and are not instrumentalities of commerce. L. REv. 957, 986-91 (1976) . TMaryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968 analysis employed above to determine whether an activity affects commerce, the instrumentality theory should be given a more restrictive meaning. An object is an instrumentality of interstate commerce only to the extent that the use of the object is necessary for the activity in question to continue in interstate commerce.ss In the context of the present issue, only the materials of media organizations operating on an interstate basis should be considered instrumentalities of commerce. Thus, a bill premised on the "instruments" theory would reach a smaller class of state searches than searches covered by a bill premised on the "affecting commerce" theory.
THE SHERMAN ACT ANALOGY
Cognizant of the constitutional uncertainty surrounding the ability of Congress to reach state searches under the commerce power, the drafters of the Privacy Protection Act did not define any activity or material that is in or affects commerce.
39
The Act prohibits the search or seizure by federal or state officials of any "work-product" or "documentary" materials "possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
40
-s There has been no court adjudication of federal statutes protecting instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Thus, there are nojudicial interpretations of what constitutes an "instrumentality of commerce." By its plain meaning, however, the term refers to an object that is necessary for an activity to engage in interstate commerce. It should not refer to materials used by any third party whose activities only may affect commerce.
9 See note 16 & accompanying text supra. The intent of the drafters of the Privacy Protection Act to follow the Sherman Act analogy is apparent from the hearings and statutory language, see notes 43-47 & accompanying text infra, although the Sherman Act was never mentioned by officials from the Department of Justice.
40 H.R. 3486, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a), (b) (1979). The bill requires federal and state officials to use the subpoena process to obtain the protected materials of third parties. Two exceptions to the search prohibition for work-product materials are provided: if there is probable cause to believe that the person possessing the material has committed or is committing the offense for which the materials are sought, §2(a)(1), and if there is reason to believe that immediate seizure of the materials is necessary to save a life, §2(a)(2). Four exceptions to the search prohibition for documentary materials are provided. The first two exceptions, §2(b)(l), (2), parallel the two exceptions for work-product materials. The last two exceptions are if there is reason to believe that giving notice pursuant to a subpoena would result in the destruction of the material, §2(b)(3), and if the materials have
The Privacy Protection Act is thus analogous to section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 4 ' which prohibits certain activities that are in or affect commerce. In each Sherman Act case, courts must determine whether the activity sought to be reached by the substantive portion of the Sherman Act is in or affects interstate commerce.
2
In the Privacy Protection Act the "in or affecting" commerce language refers to the media materials sought to be protected, not to the searches sought to be prohibited.
4
' Therefore, in each case arising under the Privacy Protection Act, a court must determine whether the searched materials were in or affecting commerce. The drafters of the Act intended that the statutory language should govern the materials to be protected:
44 those ma--terials held "in connection with a purpose to disseminate... [a] form of public communication., 45 Thus, the materials sought to be protected must satisfy both a statutory and a constitutional inquiry. Under the statutory analysis, a court must determine first, whether the materials are connected "with a purpose to disseminate" communication to the public. The drafters intended this language to reach all materials meant to be published or incorporated in a form of public communication and all materials gathered and prepared in anticipation of publication. 6 The second statutory inquiry is whether the material was part of a "form of public communication." The drafters intended this language to cover any written communication available to the general public.
4 7 Once these tests are satisfied, the constitutional inquiry would involve a determination of whether the materials were in or affected commerce. For the constitutional inquiry, the "in commerce" and "affecting commerce" analysis outlined above would be applicable. Under the "in commerce" analysis, the materials would have to be used by persons or organizations engaged in the not been produced in compliance with the subpoena, §2(b)(4). Finally, the bill does not apply to any search related to the enforcement of the customs laws. By imposing national requirements on search procedures by state and local law enforcement officials, the Privacy Protection Act would seem to interfere with "integral" and "traditional" government functions and services. The Court in National League of Cities found "police protection" to be a traditional government function, 5 8 and on other occasions the Court has emphasized the right of states to fashion their own law enforcement procedures. 59 The imposition of a national subpoena requirement to replace third-party warrant searches has the potential to "seriously undermine law enforcement efforts."0 A subpoena requirement would eliminate the element of surprise in searches and thereby facilitate destruction of evidence by third parties. 65 Moreover, those state and u 426 U.S. at 845-46 (citations omitted).
5 Id. at 851-52. its decision. 64 Rather, the displacement (of which the fiscal burden was the cause) of local government discretion in deciding how to deliver services was the factor that proved decisive for the Court. 
1980]
States. 9 In Fry, the Court upheld the imposition of federal wage controls on state employees, and the National League of Cities Court found several factors to distinguish such controls from the 1974 amendments: that the problem of inflation could be dealt with only on a national basis, that the controls were only for a limited time period, and that they displaced no state choices as to how government operations should be structured.
70
The analysis of Fry suggests that Blackmun's balancing approach can be viewed in two ways: as a utilitarian analysis of the net benefits of the federal interest to be weighed against the net losses of invading state sovereignty or as turning on the nature, not the weight, of the federal interest advanced to justify state submission.
7 ' The latter view is the more plausible one, since, as noted above, 1235-37 (1977) .
7 See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra. 7s The drafters of the Privacy Protection Act were not intending to enhance the nation's commerce as such through the bill. Therefore, the federalism interest must rest on the much narrower ground of protecting the rights of persons and organizations within each state.. This formulation makes the federalism interest under the "nature" analysis even more difficult to justify. See Stewart, supra note 71, at 1237. However, there might be spillover effects to other states in that an impairment of the ability of the media of one state to disseminate news would affect those out-of-staters who wished to hear the news. This formulation makes the federalism interest easier to justify. Id. 74 See text accompanying notes 38-44 supra. The majority opinion by Justice Brennan upheld section 4(e) of the Act on two grounds. First, Congress had the power to grant Puerto Ricans the right to vote as a means to aid them in securing equality in the statE's distribution of public services-education, housing, and law enforcement.
84
The Court's standard for testing the exercise of this remedial power was a lenient one of simply "perceiving a basis" on which Congress could have resolved the conflicting federal and state interests involved in passing section 4 (e) of the Act." As a second ground for its decision, the majority indicated that Congress could have concluded that the literacy test violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.a 6 Again, the Court stated that it was Congress' prerogative to weigh the competing considerations, and it was enough that the Court "perceive a basis" upon which Congress might predicate such a judgment. 221-29 (1977) . But see Bickel, The first rationale granted Congress power to enforce the fourteenth amendment as a basis for remedying past violations of the amendment. The second rationale gave Congress power to determine the meaning of provisions of the fourteenth amendment for itself and pass legislation directed at enforcing that determination, notwithstanding the Court's prior determination to the contrary.
A strong dissent by Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, challenged the majority on both grounds. Harlan rejected the application of the remedy rationale since there were no legislative facts to support a finding that Puerto Ricans in New York state had been discriminated against in the delivery of government services.88 More important, in rejecting the second rationale, Harlan argued that whether there was a violation of the equal protection clause was a judicial question which Congress could not answer; section 5 did not give Congress power to define the substantive scope of the fourteenth amendment. 89 If Congress had such power, he suggested, it could dilute as well as expand equal protection and due process decisions of the Court. 9 0 In response to this contention, the majority stated in a footnote that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment grants Congress no such discretion: "Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees."
91
The broad enforcement clause power the Morgan Court gave to Congress must be weighed against the much more restrictive reasoning found in Oregon v. Mitchell. 92 Such a balancing is extremely difficult, however, since the lengthy and complicated decision in Oregon v. Mitchell produced no majority opinion; three Justices authored their own opinions, and two other opinions were each joined by three Justices. So far as is pertinent here, the Court considered the 1970 Voting Rights Act amendments that lowered the voting age to eighteen for all federal and state elections 93 and suspended for five years the use of literacy tests in any federal or state election.9 By shifting five-four majorities, the Court upheld the age limitation provision as it applied to federal elections, but invalidated the provision as it applied to state elections. The suspension of literacy tests was upheld unanimously. Justice Brennan's opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and White, adhered most closely to the broad language of Morgan. Brennan, who would have upheld the application of the eighteen-yearold provision to state elections, expressed doubts as to whether a statute granting the franchise to persons older than twenty-one while denying it to eighteen year olds would survive equal protection scrutiny.
9 5 Regardless of the Court's view, however, Brennan argued that Congress' factfinding capabilities were superior to those of the Court and justified a congressional determination, based on the enforcement clause, that a state law denying the vote to persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one was unnecessary to promote any legitimate state interest and thus discriminated against that class in violation of the equal protection clause.9
In a footnote to his opinion, apparently meant to indicate that limitations still existed on the second Morgan rationale, Brennan elaborated on his Morgan footnote, which limited congressional exercise of the enforcement clause to only 'enforcing' the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. When the Court strikes down a state law on constitutional grounds, Brennan argued, it indicates, among other things, that the legislative findings supporting the law were "so far wrong as to be unreasonable." 9' If Congress were to make "identical findings on the identical issue," then its judgment would also fail to pass the Court's reasonableness standard of review.
98 Apparently, Brennan was suggesting a hypothetical case illustrating the limitation: If Congress were to enact a law grounded on section 5 that was identical to a state law struck down by the Court as violative of the fourteenth amendment, the federal law could not be upheld unless Congress based the law on findings and evidence different from those advanced by the state legislature. § 1973bb-I (1970 
9Id.
The other pivotal opinion was that of Justice Stewart,joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justice Blackmun. In his construction of Morgan, Stewart, who would have struck down the eighteen-year-old provision as it applied to either state or federal elections, upheld the first, remedial prong but placed severe restrictions on the second, interpretative prong. On the interpretative power, Stewart argued that Congress could override state laws "on the ground that they were in fact used as instruments of invidious discrimination," even though a court in a lawsuit might not reach the same factual conclusion." Stewart concluded that his invidious discrimination limitation prevented Congress from determining "as a matter of substantive constitutional law what situations" ' ' 0 violate the equal protection clause, unless the state law discriminated "against any discrete and insular minority."' 01 Since Stewart limited congressional interpretative power under section 5 to overriding those state laws discriminating against traditionally "suspect" classifications, apparently only as determined by the Court itself, Congress could not overturn the state voting laws classifying persons on the basis of age, which was not a suspect category. Based on the convoluted voting pattern in Oregon v. Mitchell, it is difficult to abstract any principles from that decision which modify the precedential value of Morgan. Moreover, the Court since 1970 has had little more to say on the two decisions beyond perfunctory citations. 0 3 In Mitchell, all the Justices expressed their willingness to support the remedial rationale of Morgan. It is important to note, however, that had the second Morgan rationale remained in full force, the Oregon v. Mitchell majority undoubtedly would have sustained the eighteen-year-old provision, just as a Court majority had sustained the Voting Rights Act provision in Morgan. However, five Justices were unwilling to do so; the Stewart group of three limited this aspect of Morgan to situations involving suspect classifica9Id. at 296 (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). Unlike Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart found it "inconceivable" that the Court would find the denial of the franchise to persons between 18 and 21 years of age a denial of equal protection. Id. at 295 n.14.
"'0Id. at 296.
tions, while Justices Black and Harlan found limits on the section 5 power in the history of the enactment of the fourteenth amendment. These limits, in their view, granted discretion to the states to govern the voting procedures of their own citizens.1 4 The following discussion will examine the extent to which the two rationales of Morgan remain in force and the implications of those rationales for the bills overruling Stanford Daily.
CONGRESSIONAL REMEDY PRONG OF MORGAN
The ability of Congress to fashion remedies through section 5 to cure discrimination or other state action contrary to the fourteenth amendment is the most accepted and least controversial aspect of Morgan. This prong of Morgan apparently emerged unscathed from Oregon v. Mitchell since the five opinions in that case unanimously upheld the provision suspending literacy tests for voting as a remedial measure." 0 5 Moreover, the Court has recently reaffirmed this prong of Morgan in dicta.' 6 Several commentators have suggested that the bills overruling Stanford Daily as applied to the states can bejustified under section 5 as a remedial measure." 07 Under this theory, Congress could create a prophylactic remedy to deter the number of potential unconstitutional searches resulting from improperly obtained or executed warrants, notwithstanding the Court's determination in Stanford Daily that the Constitution did not mandate such a remedy.1' 5 The requirement of an adversary '0 400 U.S. at 117-35 (Black, J.); id. at 152-229 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
105 More specifically, it generally is agreed that the Justices were analyzing the second rationale of Morgan when considering the 18-year-old provision. Professor Gunther suggests that both Morgan rationales were at issue. G. GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 1033. However, the government defended the Voting Rights Act amendments solely on the basis of the second Morgan rationale, see D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE IN A NUTSHELL 249-50 (1974) , and other commentators see the second rationale as the one in issue. J. 103 Nearly all the bills to overrule Stanford Daiy also provide that aggrieved citizens may sue government ofhearing in which the third party could contest the existence of probable cause necessary for a subpoena likely would reduce the number of future unconstitutional searches. Such a remedy, these proponents argue, falls under the power granted Congress in the first rationale in Morgan that was affirmed in Oregon v. Mitchell.
9
However, there are several difficulties with this approach. On a theoretical level, the distinction between remedy and interpretation advanced in Morgan may not be a sharp one. It is not clear how a statute providing a remedy to a fourteenth amendment violation can be distinguished from a statute decreeing that such a violation exists. Such a distinction may turn largely on the asserted basis for the statute rather than on the substantive scope of the law. 110 For example, in the present case a bill overruling Stanford Daily based on the remedial power would differ in its language little, if at all, from the same bill purporting to rely on the interpretative power of Congress under the enforcement clause.
Even accepting the distinction as valid, however, Congress would still be required to develop an adequate record indicating that an appropriate remedy is necessary. Despite the relative leniency of the "perceive a basis" test for remedial measures stated in Morgan, the dissenters in that case failed to perceive any basis in the congressional factual records or findings."' However, Justices Harlan and Stewart, the Morgan dissenters, did find an adequate record in Oregon v. Mitchell to sustain the ban on literacy tests as a remedial measure since there was ample evidence that such tests had long been used throughout the nation as a device to ficials who violate the procedures established by the bill. See, e.g., H.R. 4181, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)- (d) deny the franchise to potential voters. 11 2 Thus, as was discussed above in a similar context in relation to the commerce clause, Congress must set out findings which indicate a need for remedial measures to deter the possibility of the abuse of constitutional rights through the use of search warrants against third parties.1 3 On its face, the "perceive a basis" test resembles the lenient "mere rationality" test found in cases reviewing congressional determinations that certain activities impact on commerce.
1 1 4 Arguably, however, to impose a nationwide remedy even under the "perceive a basis" test would require a showing that current search warrant activities against the media and related third parties are a national problem. A more substantial record to that effect than the one currently before Congress would be required to create such a showing. The most controversial rationale of Morgan was the apparent power it gave Congress to interpret for itself, through section 5, the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. This power not only allowed Congress to usurp a traditional judicial function-interpreting the Constitution-but on its face allowed Congress to modify contrary Supreme Court interpretations. This aspect of Morgan was not oqly heavily criticized on its own account, but it is not clear to what extent it survived Oregon v.
Mitchell.
Most commentators focused their scrutiny on Justice Brennan's effort to limit the extent of this rationale. In his footnote in Morgan, Justice Brennan stated that Congress could not "restrict" or 112 400 U.S. at 216-17 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 282-84 (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 604-05 (2d Cir. 1978 ), cert. granted, 441 U.S. 960 (1979 (No. 78-1007 , 1979 . Interestingly, the court found "troublesome" the sparse record before Congress, but nevertheless found the evidence sufficient to meet the "perceive a basis" test. 584 F.2d at 605-06. This concern with the legislative record parallels similar concerns this comment has expressed concerning the record to support the Stanford Daily bills. The Supreme Court's forthcoming decision in Fullilove may clarify the scope of the remedial prong of Morgan.
"dilute" the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. 11 6 As various critics pointed out,"
7 Morgan did not explain the distinction between "expanding" and "restricting": If the congressional interpretive power was grounded on a special legislative competence to make findings and weigh conflicting considerations, why could not Congress simply interpret as it saw fit? Nor did Brennan's elaboration of his "ratchet" theory in Oregon v. Mitchell prove helpful, 118 since he discussed only the narrow ground of the ability of Congress to make findings that will override the findings made by state legislatures on the same issue.
1 9 This reasoning did not address the more general issue of Congress' power to "dilute" a fourteenth amendment "guarantee," nor did he address the problem of which branch of government was to determine the definition and scope of those guarantees in the first instance.
Finally The first "dilution" is not present in those bills extending protection to all third parties. The second "dilution" is suggested by at least one authority. CLC Memo, supra note 22, at 341. However, the latter argument is weakened by the fact that an accused raising the right of a fair trial would rarely desire information that is also sought by law enforcement officials. Given the split of opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell, relying on that decision alone to discern the viability of the second Morgan rationale is a nearly impossible task. The value of the second Morgan prong, however, must be considered reduced to some extent merely on the basis of the bare holding in Oregon v. Mitchell striking down the voting-age provision as it applied to the states. At least one writer suggests that the major modification that the ruling in Oregon v. Mitchell made in the second Morgan rationale was to require a higher standard of review for the reasonableness of congressional action than the lenient "perceive a basis" test adopted in Morgan. '2s In response to the uncertainty generated by Oregon v. Mitchell, several commentators have advanced theories that suggest modifications of the second Morgan rationale that would still permit Congress to retain a role in constitutional interpretation. The extent to which these theories impact on the section 5 bases of the bills overruling Stanford Daily is outlined below. However, since none of these theories have been adopted by the Court, it is impossible to determine which test the bills may have to meet. There are several problems with this approach. Apart from the difficulty of determining whether a Supreme Court decision, or a congressional judgment, turns on federalism rather than liberty concerns, it is doubtful in light of National League of Cities that the Court would be willing to give free reign to a congressional judgment on federalism that is in conflict with state law and has the potential for invading state sovereignty. The bills at issue here arguably would survive the Tribe analysis. If protection of first and fourth amendment rights is a "purpose" of the fourteenth amendment, then the Stanford Daily bills satisfy the first inquiry. The bills apparently satisfy the second inquiry since they expand guarantees in the Bill of Rights. However, the bills also must avoid inconsistency with other external restraints on congressional power. Federalism, as interpreted in National League of Cities, would be among the external restraints the bills must confront, and the same analysis as outlined in the discussion of the commerce clause then would be applicable. The bills still would have to be measured against the tenth amendment barrier prohibiting invasion of state sovereign functions.
15°U
nderenforcement Theory. A fourth theory of the "ratchet" limitation has been developed by Professor Lawrence Sager. 151 Sager argues that Congress can exercise its section 5 power to enforce and expand constitutional claims when the federal judiciary has declined to uphold the claim based on "institutional" concerns of the judiciary. These institutional barriers, such as the mere rationality standard of review in equal protection adjudication, which the Court justifies on the basis of a judicial incompetence to make complex policy determinations, should not prevent the exercise of the section 5 power to expand rights since the legal scope of a constitutional norm is not coterminous 148 L. TRIBE, supra note 64, at 271-72. However, when a court decision "is firmly rooted in analytical rather than institutional perceptions,"' 55 Congress may noi expand the constitutional norm limited by the decision. The Stanford Daily Court's refusal to expand the first and fourth amendment rights of the student newspaper clearly rests on analytical, not institutional, grounds. As noted above,1 54 the Court relied on principles of the fourth amendment and did not decline to address factual considerations, as the Court essentially does when it declines to overturn a federal or state law by evaluating the law under the mere rationality test of equal protection analysis. Thus, Sager's theory does not provide a basis to support the Stanford Daily bills.
IV. CONCLUSION
A legitimate concern for protecting the first and fourth amendment rights of the institutional media, as well as other related third parties, has motivated Congress to consider legislation that will mandate procedures to modify the Court's holding in Stanford Daily. However,; members of Congress must be cognizant" of the constitutional limits inherent in the commerce clause and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment when applying procedures to state officials.
I
The lack of an adequate ,factual record demonstrating the need for the bills to reach the states may prove to be the critical element in any judicial determination of the constitutionality of the proposed legislation. Under commerce clause reasoning, there is virtually no data to suggest that the small number of warranted searches of media offices and related third parties has had any effect on the media's ability to g6ather and disseminate news and thereby have a sufficient impact on commerce to trigger Congress' commerce power. Likewise, there, is admittedly little systematic data available to predict the impact of the Privacy Protection Act on the functioning of state and local law enforcement efficiency. The deterrent effect of the potential for warranted searches immeasurably may affect the media's ability to engage in commerce so as to be reached, if only at the extreme margin, by the commerce power. Likewise, the invasion of state sovereignty prohibited by the tenth amendment turns on the nature, not weight, of the state function impaired by the federal law.
